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Abstract
The present studies tested the hypothesis that strong assumptions about within-category homoge-
neity impede children’s recognition of the inductive value of diverse samples of evidence. In Study
1a, children (7-year-olds) and adults were randomly assigned to receive a prime emphasizing within-
category variability, a prime emphasizing within-category similarities, or to not receive a prime.
Only following the variability prime, children demonstrated a reliable preference for evaluating
diverse over nondiverse samples to determine whether there is support for a category-wide general-
ization. Adults demonstrated a robust preference for diverse samples in all conditions. These effects
extended beyond the specific categories included in the prime, as well as to multiple types of test
questions. Study 1b demonstrated that priming variability leads children to select diverse samples
only when doing so is informative for induction. Implications for conceptual development are
discussed.
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1. Introduction
Categories are incredibly powerful cognitive tools, in large part because they allow peo-
ple to overlook superficial similarities and focus on the properties that individuals share. A
critical function of categories is to promote inductive learning (Rips, 1975). Thus, upon
learning something about an individual (e.g., that a spider bites), we can generalize this
information to the category as a whole (e.g., all spiders) and use this information to guide
behavior (e.g., to avoid spiders).
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Great inductive power is gained by assuming that categories are homogeneous (e.g.,
assuming that spiders share many observable and unobservable features; Gelman, 1988).
Yet strong homogeneity assumptions can also lead us astray. For example, not all spiders
bite, and those that do vary in the level of threat that their bites pose. Whereas avoiding all
spiders, despite this variability, may be an acceptable strategy, there are clear cases where
assuming homogeneity can have problematic consequences. For example, if a child assumes
that all dogs are friendly because her pet cocker spaniel is friendly, she may put herself in a
dangerous situation if she encounters a pit bull.
The goal of this article is to examine the role of within-category variability in inductive
reasoning and how it changes across development. In particular, this study tests the hypothe-
sis that young children consider within-category variability less readily than adults do, lead-
ing to systematic developmental differences in inductive reasoning.
Evidence that adults consider within-category variability in category-based induction
comes from work on how adults evaluate the inductive potential of various samples. Adults
do not view all samples as equivalently informative for drawing inferences about a category
as a whole (Feeney & Heit, 2007; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990; Rips,
1975). Although adults attend to a variety of features for evaluating samples (Medin, Coley,
Storms, & Hayes, 2003), a key criterion that they attend to robustly is sample diversity
(Heit, 2000; Heit, Hahn, & Feeney, 2004). Adults view samples that diversely represent a
category (e.g., a Chihuahua and a collie) as more informative than nondiverse samples (two
Chihuahuas). This preference for diverse samples indicates an awareness that individuals
within categories vary in important ways and that it is useful to sample from across that var-
iability before generalizing to a category as a whole. Adults’ preference for diverse samples
has been documented in a number of tasks, including their ratings of inductive arguments
(Osherson et al., 1990) and their evidence selection (Kim & Keil, 2003; Lopez, 1995;
Lopez, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997; Rhodes, Brickman, et al., 2008; Rhodes,
Gelman, et al., 2008).
In contrast, there is substantial evidence that children, before age 9, do not value sam-
ples that diversely represent categories. For example, in Lopez, Gelman, Gutheil, and
Smith (1992), 6- and 8-year-olds were equally likely to extend a property to a category
after learning that it was found in a diverse or a nondiverse sample (see also Carey, 1985;
Gutheil & Gelman, 1997; Rhodes, Gelman, & Brickman, 2010). In Rhodes, Gelman, et al.
(2008) and Rhodes, Brickman, et al. (2008) children younger than age 9 did not reliably
choose to create diverse samples of evidence (e.g., they were equally likely to choose to
check a robin and an eagle to see whether a property is true of birds as they were to check
two robins).
Children’s failure to attend to sample diversity in inductive reasoning tasks is meaningful
for several reasons. First, it is clear that children’s neglect of sample diversity does not relate
to problems noticing or processing diversity. A control condition in Rhodes, Gelman, et al.
(2008) documented that 6-year-olds could reliably distinguish diverse from nondiverse sam-
ples, yet they did not view diverse samples as more informative. Heit and Hahn (2001) also
provide evidence that 5-year-olds can recognize and reason about sample diversity (e.g., that
children can sort diverse vs. nondiverse samples; see also Shipley & Shepperson, 2006).
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Second, children’s failure to attend to sample diversity cannot be attributed to general diffi-
culties with statistical reasoning, or in reasoning about the relation between samples and
populations (Xu & Denison, 2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008).
The hypothesis considered in this work is that children’s failure to recognize the value of
diverse samples for induction is conceptual in nature and stems from a great emphasis on
within-category homogeneity in early concepts. Put simply, if children have a strong
assumption that all dogs are fundamentally the same, why should it matter to them which
dogs they observe? From this perspective, what changes across development is how assump-
tions about category homogeneity are balanced with expectations about within-category
variability.
Gelman (2003) has argued that cognitive biases to assume that categories are homo-
geneous play a powerful role in early conceptual development; they propel knowledge
acquisition by allowing children to overlook superficial differences and focus on underlying
regularities. Such biases may discourage children from incorporating within-category vari-
ability into their concepts (Gelman & Kalish, 1993). From this perspective, although
children perceive within-category variability, strong homogeneity biases lead children to
exclude variability from their concepts.
A number of previous developmental studies support the hypothesis that children view
categories as more homogeneous than adults do. For example, young children have strong
expectations that category members will behave in category-consistent manners, even in the
face of contrasting individuating information (Berndt & Heller, 1986; Taylor, 1996). Also,
preschool children are more likely than adults to believe that their everyday categories
reflect an objective natural reality (Kalish, 1998; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009a,b) and to infer
that a property observed in one individual will be true of a category (Rhodes & Gelman,
2008).
2. Method, Study 1a
The goal of this study was to test whether failure to consider within-category variability
contributes to children’s neglect of sample diversity in inductive reasoning. By random
assignment, children completed primes that focused them on within-category variability,
within-category similarities, or, in a control condition, not to complete priming activities.
Next, children completed evidence selection tasks, to test whether exposure to variability
increases preferences for evaluating diverse samples before making category-wide gener-
alizations.
Test questions involved the categories that were presented as part of the primes, as well
as other categories that were not included in the primes. Thus, this work tests whether the
effect of priming variability operates only on the category for which variability information
is introduced, or whether effects extend to other similarly structured categories within the
domain. This work tested appreciation for two distinct types of diversity: diversity based on
sampling locations (e.g., whether a sample of fish drawn from four different lakes is more
informative than a sample drawn from a single lake for inferences about all fish) and
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sampling categories (e.g., whether a sample comprised of a basset hound and a collie is
more informative than two collies for inferences about all dogs).
This study included 7-year-old children. Previous work has found that a reliable prefer-
ence for diverse samples develops around ages 8–9; thus, 7-year-olds should not yet value
sample diversity but would perhaps be close enough to developing this preference that it
could be elicited given a particular experimental context. For comparison purposes, this
work also included adult participants. Because adults have fairly robust preferences for sam-
ple diversity, they should reliably select diverse samples across all three conditions, whereas
children should do so only following the variability prime.
2.1. Participants
Participants included 57 children (34 males, 23 females; M age = 7.03 years,
range = 5.64–7.61 years) recruited from first grade classrooms in a public elementary
school in a midsize city in the Midwestern United States. Adult participants included 48
college students, recruited from campus locations in the same midsize city, who volunteered
to participate in exchange for a $5 gift card.
2.2. Procedures
Children completed the experiment during individual sessions with trained undergrad-
uate research assistants in a quiet area of their school. Adults completed the experiment
independently, using a computer program. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of three conditions, each containing 19 children and 16 adults: Variability, Similarity,
or Control.
In both the Variability and Similarity conditions, the experiment began with exposure to
information about an animal category (birds or dogs). In both conditions, children were
shown a colorful picture that contained 36 diverse exemplars drawn from the category. Iden-
tical stimuli were used across conditions. They then completed an activity with the experi-
menter, which was designed to draw their attention to all of the exemplars in the set.
Children were asked to point to the same number of exemplars in both conditions, and
primes were presented with similar levels of enthusiasm by the experimenter.
2.2.1. Primes
2.2.1.1.Variability: In the Variability condition, for the category birds, children were told,
‘‘Look at all these birds! See how different they all are? Look. There are a lot of different
colors. Point to some that have different colors. Some have big beaks and some have small
beaks. Can you point to some with big beaks? And with small beaks? Some fly and some
don’t. Can you find one that flies? And one that doesn’t fly? Some are very big and some are
very small. Where is one that is very big? Where is one that is very small? Some of them
eat small things like worms, and some of them eat big things like mice. Do you see some
that eat small things? How about birds that eat big things? Do you see anything else?’’ The
activity was comparable for the category dogs.
1564 M. Rhodes, D. Brickman ⁄ Cognitive Science 34 (2010)
2.2.1.2. Similarity: In the Similarity condition, for the category birds, children were told,
‘‘Look at all these birds! See how many there are? Look. They all have feathers. Can you
point to some feathers? They all have beaks. Point to their beaks! They all have babies by
laying eggs. Can you point to some that have babies by laying eggs? They all have little
scales on their feet. Do you see the scales on their feet? And they all feed their babies by
putting food right in their mouths! Point to some that feed their babies that way. Do you see
anything else?’’ The activity was comparable for the category dogs.
2.2.2. Order and test questions
In both the Variability and Similarity conditions, children first completed a prime (for
either the category dog or the category bird). Then, they were asked a sampling-locations
task (see below) about the category presented in the prime, followed by a sampling-
locations task about one new animal category (either monkeys or fish; see Table 1).
Subsequently, they completed another priming activity for whichever category they had
not completed initially, followed by a sampling-locations task about the category in this
prime and a sampling-locations task about the other new category. Next, children com-
pleted six sampling-categories questions (see Table 1), including four new categories
(cats, pigs, frogs, and turtles) and the two primed categories (dogs and birds). In this
block, the questions about the primed categories were always asked last, so that response
strategies used for these categories would not influence how children responded to the
new categories. The following factors were counter-balanced across participants: whether
the first priming activity was for birds or dogs, whether the first new sampling-locations
question was for monkeys or fish, the order of the four sampling-categories questions
involving new animal categories, and the order of the sampling-categories questions for
the primed categories.
Table 1
Summary of categories, properties, and samples for the test questions
Task Type Category Property Diverse Sample Nondiverse Sample
Sampling
locations




One dog from each of four towns Four dogs from one
town
Monkeys Have spleens inside One monkey from each of four jungles Four monkeys from
one jungle




Frogs Have a carapace inside One green tree frog; one orange frog Two green tree frogs
Turtles Have fused tailbones One box turtle; one large turtle Two box turtles
Cats Have papillae One black cat; one orange cat Two black cats
Pigs Have prenasal bones One pink pig; one pink ⁄ black pig Two pink pigs




Birds Are endothermic One cardinal; one blue jay Two cardinals
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2.2.2.1. Sampling locations: These questions followed Rhodes, Gelman, et al. (2008).
Children were shown four scenes (e.g., four mountain tops), and were told, for example,
‘‘Let’s pretend that you are a scientist who is trying to find out something new about
birds. You are trying to find out if birds have hollow bones. But you can’t look at all
the birds in the world to find out if birds have hollow bones; you can only look at four
birds—just four. Here are some mountains. There are birds that live on each of these
mountains. So, to find out if birds have hollow bones, do you want to look at four birds
from one mountain, or one bird from each mountain? Which birds should you look at
to find out if birds have hollow bones?’’ The order of the answer choices was counter-
balanced across participants.
2.2.2.2. Sampling categories: These questions followed Rhodes, Brickman, et al. (2008)
(see Table 1). Children were shown two sets of animals from the same basic-level category:
one diverse sample (e.g., a black Labrador and a golden retriever), and one nondiverse sam-
ple (e.g., two golden retrievers). Children were asked, for example, ‘‘Pretend you’re a scien-
tist studying dogs. Your job is to find out if dogs are dichromatic. But you can’t look at all
of the dogs in the world to find out about dogs. You can only look at two dogs, just two.
Which dogs do you want to look at to find out about dogs?’’ Children responded by pointing
to the diverse or nondiverse set. The lateral position of the diverse sample was counter-
balanced across questions.
3. Results
Analyses were conducted using a generalized linear model, with a binomial probability
distribution and a logit link function. The dependent variable was the number of diverse-
sample selections out of the total possible for each type of question. Age and condition were
entered as fixed factors, and analyses test for main effects of each variable, as well as for an
interaction. Wald chi-square statistics were generated as indicators of the significance of
these predictor variables. Descriptive statistics are presented as proportions of diverse-
sample selections. These data, with 95% Wald confidence intervals, are presented in Figs. 1
and 2. In these figures, values with error bars that do not overlap the line marking .50 (the
proportion of diverse responses expected by chance) indicate that average responses differed
from equal probability responding.
3.1. Sampling locations
Examining the four sampling-locations questions revealed an effect of Age,
v2(1) = 41.81, p < .001, and an interaction between Age and Condition, v2(2) = 7.61,
p = .02. Children selected diverse samples more often in the Variability condition than in
either the Similarity or Control conditions (compared to similarity, p < .001, compared to
control, p = .01), whereas adults’ responses did not vary by condition (see Fig. 1A,B). Rela-
tive to the Control condition, the variability prime doubled the likelihood of selecting a
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diverse sample (OR = 2.24; 95% CI: 1.17, 4.30). The same pattern was found for the
categories included in the prime and the new categories; for both sets of categories, children
selected diverse samples more often in the Variability condition than in either of the other
two conditions (for some effects, these comparisons were marginally significant, perhaps
due to the small number of questions asked when these items are examined separately, all
ps < .09).
As shown in Fig. 1A, for sampling-locations questions, children selected diverse samples
more often than expected by chance in the Variability condition, for the analysis of the
primed categories and total categories. For the new categories, children’s selections of
diverse samples did not exceed the level expected by chance, and children in the Similarity
condition reliably selected nondiverse samples. Children’s responses in the Control condi-
tion did not differ from chance for any question type.
3.2. Sampling categories
For responses to the six sampling-categories questions, there were significant effects of





























































Fig. 1. Proportions of questions on which children (A) and adults (B) selected diverse samples on sampling-
location questions. Note. Error bars represent Wald 95% confidence intervals. Error bars that do not overlap with
the line marking .50 indicate that the mean for that condition is reliably different from the proportion expected by
chance.
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between Age and Condition, v2(2) = 12.65, p = .002. As shown in Fig. 2A,B, children
selected diverse samples more often in the Variability condition than in either the Simi-
larity or Control conditions, ps < .001, whereas adults’ responses did not vary by condi-
tion. Relative to the Control condition, the variability prime increased the likelihood of
selecting a diverse sample by 4.12 (CI: 2.34, 7.28). The same pattern was found for the
categories included in the prime as for the new categories; in each case, children selected
diverse samples more often in the variability condition than in either other condition, all
ps < .01.
For each type of category-sampling question, children selected diverse samples more
often than expected by chance only in the Variability condition, whereas adults reliably
selected diverse samples in each condition. Children reliably preferred nondiverse samples
in the Similarity condition for the primed categories; no other pattern of responses reliably
differed from chance.
3.3. Individual response patterns
Analyses of individual response patterns revealed similar patterns as were found for the





























































Fig. 2. Proportions of questions on which children (A) and adults (B) selected diverse samples on sampling-catego-
ries questions. Note. Error bars represent Wald 95% confidence intervals. Error bars that do not overlap with the line
marking .50 indicate that the mean for that condition is reliably different from the proportion expected by chance.
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4. Study 1b
The results from Study 1a may indicate that, as hypothesized, the variability prime led
children to recognize the informative value of diverse samples. Another possibility,
however, is that the variability prime led to a generalized belief that diverse samples are
more interesting or important, thus accounting for increased selections of diverse samples
without a particular recognition of their inductive value.
To evaluate these possibilities, in Study 1b, a new sample of children (n = 20) completed
the two variability primes from Study 1a. Subsequently, children were asked six questions
identical to the sampling-categories questions asked in Study 1a (see Table 1), with the
exception that half of the children were asked to find out whether properties applied to spe-
cific subtypes that were included in the samples (e.g., an additional picture of a golden retrie-
ver was shown, and children were asked ‘‘to find out if this kind of dog is dichromatic’’),
whereas the other half were asked questions in an identical manner to Study 1a (e.g., ‘‘to find
out if dogs are dichromatic’’). In both conditions, children could choose between the two
samples offered in the sampling-categories questions of Study 1a (see Table 1). If children
reliably select diverse samples for the entire category questions, but not the subtype ques-
tions, this would suggest that the variability prime leads children to use diversity in a system-
atic manner—only when it makes a sample more informative for the question at hand.
Results indicated that children in the subtype condition showed no reliable preference for
diverse samples (M = 0.53, CI: 0.41, 0.66), whereas consistent with Study 1a, children in the
whole-category condition did (M = 0.70, CI: 0.58, 0.82). These data suggest that the variabil-
ity prime led children to view diverse samples as more informative for category-wide infer-
ences, not to a generalized belief that diverse samples are more interesting or important.
5. Discussion
In these studies, priming 7-year-old children with within-category variability increased
their appreciation of the inductive power of diverse samples. Thus, whether individuals
account for within-category variability importantly influences inductive reasoning.
Interestingly, priming within-category homogeneity did not influence children’s responses
(as children in the Similarity and Control conditions did not differ), supporting the proposal
that children’s everyday concepts emphasize underlying regularities. These findings support
the proposals that young children’s emphasis on within-category homogeneity impedes their
recognition of the value of diverse samples for induction, and that what develops across
childhood is increased incorporation of within-category variability into children’s concepts.
Priming within-category variability increased selections of diverse samples across two
types of questions (sampling locations and sampling categories) targeted toward category-
wide generalization, but not for questions targeted toward learning about a specific subtype.
Thus, priming within-category variability led children to value diverse samples in a system-
atic and coherent manner. Although similar effects were found across the two sampling
tasks, effects were larger for sampling-categories than sampling-locations questions. This
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could be either due to the order of the test trials, or perhaps to simpler response demands for
the sampling-categories questions (e.g., sampling-categories questions asked children to
point to one of two visually presented samples, whereas sampling-locations questions asked
children to point to each of four locations or four times to one location).
There are at least two processes by which the primes presented in this study could have
led to increased appreciation for sample diversity. First, the primes could have functioned to
increase children’s knowledge. In this manner, the primes could be considered informa-
tional, such that children were unaware of the variability that existed among birds, for exam-
ple, and the prime makes them aware of it. From this perspective, what is acquired across
development would be an increase in children’s specific knowledge about animal categories
(see Proffitt, Coley, & Medin, 2000). Alternately, the primes could have served to challenge
children’s abstract beliefs (or their ‘‘framework theories’’) about the structure of natural
kind categories. From this perspective, exposure to meaningful variability within the cate-
gory bird challenges children’s general belief that animal categories are homogeneous, such
that the effect of the prime is on the conceptual structure of the domain of animals.
There are several reasons to favor this second explanation. In these data, children’s pref-
erence for diverse samples extended beyond categories included in the prime. Importantly,
this study was designed to prevent the possibility that children could recognize the value of
diverse samples for only the primed categories, and then carry over their response strategy
to the new categories. On the sampling-categories questions, which provided the strongest
evidence of generalization to new categories, the new categories were always presented first,
before questions about the primed categories. The sampling-categories questions were in a
different format, used different stimuli, and required different forms of responses than the
sampling-locations questions or the activities in the prime. Thus, children’s valuing of
sample diversity on these items could not result from a carryover of a response strategy
developed for the primed categories.
Furthermore, previous work suggests that children’s neglect of within-category variabil-
ity does not relate to ignorance about variation. Instead, children appear to acknowledge
variation, but they view it as inconsequential for their understanding of the category as a
whole. For example, in Gelman and Raman (2003), 4-year-olds were shown a picture of two
penguins and asked, ‘‘Do these birds fly?’’ Children responded with ‘‘no,’’ indicating that
they were aware of this category anomaly. When children were shown the same picture,
however, and asked, ‘‘Do birds fly?’’ they reliably responded with ‘‘yes,’’ indicating that
their awareness of the category anomalies did not influence their beliefs about the category
as a whole. Thus, what appears to change across development is not only increased knowl-
edge of variation, but increased appreciation that this variability has important implications.
As prior work suggests that children are on the cusp of developing this appreciation in mid-
dle childhood (ages 7–9), an open question is whether priming variability would also
increase preferences for diverse samples among younger children.
Overall, the present findings and previous work are consistent with the interpretation that
exposure to within-category variability challenges children’s abstract beliefs about the nat-
ure of animal categories. Previous work has demonstrated that children hold such abstract
beliefs about animal categories that extend beyond their knowledge of specific animals.
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Rhodes and Gelman (2009b) found that children expect animal categories to have absolute
boundaries (in contrast to the boundaries of artifact categories, which they view as graded),
and that they applied these expectations to both novel and familiar animals. Additionally,
Brandone and Gelman (2009) found that children generated generic noun phrases to
describe fictional animal, but not artifact, categories (e.g., after exposure to a single new
‘‘modie’’ with many eyes, children generated sentences like ‘‘Modies have a lot of eyes’’).
Thus, they assumed that new animal categories would have high levels of coherence, even
in the absence of any previous specific knowledge.
The present proposals indicate that children should more readily appreciate sample diver-
sity for artifact categories than for natural kinds, due to domain differences in their assump-
tions about within-category homogeneity. Interestingly, two previous sets of studies
examining diversity-based reasoning with artifact categories both produced more positive
assessments of children’s abilities (Heit & Hahn, 2001; Shipley & Shepperson, 2006). How-
ever, the methods used in these studies were quite different from methods used to examine
reasoning with natural kinds, and they may not tap the same component of diversity-based
reasoning (see discussion in Rhodes, Gelman, et al., 2008). Thus, future work should
directly compare diversity-based induction with animal and artifact categories.
The present findings contribute to our understanding of developmental changes in induc-
tion across childhood. Whereas children demonstrate many adult-like strategies in their
category-based induction (e.g., basing inference on conceptual categories over superficial
perceptual properties, Gelman & Markman, 1986), it may be that the same early-emerging
biases that enable the early development of category-based induction (e.g., biases to focus
on underlying regularities) also serve to prevent children from recognizing the value of
sample diversity. Future work should examine the developmental trajectory of how children
incorporate within-category variability into their concepts across development.
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Appendix
Individual response patterns, by age and condition, Study 1
Diverse Nondiverse Other
Children
Variability 8 0 11
Similarity 2 0 17
Control 1 2 16
Adults
Variability 8 0 8
Similarity 8 0 8
Control 8 0 8
Note. According to the binomial theorem, consistently selecting diverse or nondiverse
samples across all six questions would be unlikely to result from chance alone, p = .03. Thus,
we identified the number of participants displaying a consistent response strategy across all
trials, and all other participants were coded as ‘‘other.’’ Fisher’s exact tests confirmed that the
distribution of codes varied by condition for children, p = .01, but not for adults.
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